Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn Meet Tullock
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909388064686080 |
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| author | Fu, Qiang Wu, Zenan Zhu, Yuxuan |
| author_facet | Fu, Qiang Wu, Zenan Zhu, Yuxuan |
| contents | This paper examines the optimal organizational rules that govern the process of dividing a fixed surplus. The process is modeled as a sequential multilateral bargaining game with costly recognition. The designer sets the voting rule -- i.e., the minimum number of votes required to approve a proposal -- and the mechanism for proposer recognition, which is modeled as a biased generalized lottery contest. We show that for diverse design objectives, the optimum can be achieved by a dictatorial voting rule, which simplifies the game into a standard biased contest model. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_08419 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn Meet Tullock Fu, Qiang Wu, Zenan Zhu, Yuxuan Theoretical Economics This paper examines the optimal organizational rules that govern the process of dividing a fixed surplus. The process is modeled as a sequential multilateral bargaining game with costly recognition. The designer sets the voting rule -- i.e., the minimum number of votes required to approve a proposal -- and the mechanism for proposer recognition, which is modeled as a biased generalized lottery contest. We show that for diverse design objectives, the optimum can be achieved by a dictatorial voting rule, which simplifies the game into a standard biased contest model. |
| title | Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn Meet Tullock |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.08419 |