DecentPeeR: A Self-Incentivised & Inclusive Decentralized Peer Review System
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866912117756526592 |
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| author | Gruendler, Johannes Melnyk, Darya Pourdamghani, Arash Schmid, Stefan |
| author_facet | Gruendler, Johannes Melnyk, Darya Pourdamghani, Arash Schmid, Stefan |
| contents | Peer review, as a widely used practice to ensure the quality and integrity of publications, lacks a well-defined and common mechanism to self-incentivize virtuous behavior across all the conferences and journals. This is because information about reviewer efforts and author feedback typically remains local to a single venue, while the same group of authors and reviewers participate in the publication process across many venues. Previous attempts to incentivize the reviewing process assume that the quality of reviews and papers authored correlate for the same person, or they assume that the reviewers can receive physical rewards for their work. In this paper, we aim to keep track of reviewing and authoring efforts by users (who review and author) across different venues while ensuring self-incentivization. We show that our system, DecentPeeR, incentivizes reviewers to behave according to the rules, i.e., it has a unique Nash equilibrium in which virtuous behavior is rewarded. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_08450 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | DecentPeeR: A Self-Incentivised & Inclusive Decentralized Peer Review System Gruendler, Johannes Melnyk, Darya Pourdamghani, Arash Schmid, Stefan Digital Libraries Computers and Society Computer Science and Game Theory Peer review, as a widely used practice to ensure the quality and integrity of publications, lacks a well-defined and common mechanism to self-incentivize virtuous behavior across all the conferences and journals. This is because information about reviewer efforts and author feedback typically remains local to a single venue, while the same group of authors and reviewers participate in the publication process across many venues. Previous attempts to incentivize the reviewing process assume that the quality of reviews and papers authored correlate for the same person, or they assume that the reviewers can receive physical rewards for their work. In this paper, we aim to keep track of reviewing and authoring efforts by users (who review and author) across different venues while ensuring self-incentivization. We show that our system, DecentPeeR, incentivizes reviewers to behave according to the rules, i.e., it has a unique Nash equilibrium in which virtuous behavior is rewarded. |
| title | DecentPeeR: A Self-Incentivised & Inclusive Decentralized Peer Review System |
| topic | Digital Libraries Computers and Society Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.08450 |