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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.09770 |
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| _version_ | 1866915127653040128 |
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| author | Moustafa, Mariam Sethi, Mohit Aura, Tuomas |
| author_facet | Moustafa, Mariam Sethi, Mohit Aura, Tuomas |
| contents | The adoption of security protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) has significantly improved the state of traffic encryption and integrity protection on the Internet. Despite rigorous analysis, vulnerabilities continue to emerge, sometimes due to fundamental flaws in the protocol specification. This paper examines the security of TLS when using Raw Public Key (RPK) authentication. This mode has not been as extensively studied as X.509 certificates and Pre-Shared Keys (PSK). We develop a formal model of TLS RPK using applied pi calculus and the ProVerif verification tool, revealing that the RPK mode is susceptible to identity misbinding attacks. Our contributions include formal models of TLS RPK with several mechanisms for binding the endpoint identity to its public key, verification results, practical scenarios demonstrating the misbinding attack, and recommendations for mitigating such vulnerabilities. These findings highlight the need for improved security measures in TLS RPK. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_09770 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Misbinding Raw Public Keys to Identities in TLS Moustafa, Mariam Sethi, Mohit Aura, Tuomas Cryptography and Security The adoption of security protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) has significantly improved the state of traffic encryption and integrity protection on the Internet. Despite rigorous analysis, vulnerabilities continue to emerge, sometimes due to fundamental flaws in the protocol specification. This paper examines the security of TLS when using Raw Public Key (RPK) authentication. This mode has not been as extensively studied as X.509 certificates and Pre-Shared Keys (PSK). We develop a formal model of TLS RPK using applied pi calculus and the ProVerif verification tool, revealing that the RPK mode is susceptible to identity misbinding attacks. Our contributions include formal models of TLS RPK with several mechanisms for binding the endpoint identity to its public key, verification results, practical scenarios demonstrating the misbinding attack, and recommendations for mitigating such vulnerabilities. These findings highlight the need for improved security measures in TLS RPK. |
| title | Misbinding Raw Public Keys to Identities in TLS |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.09770 |