Sharp Testable Implications of Encouragement Designs
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866918207378423808 |
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| author | Bai, Yuehao Huang, Shunzhuang Tabord-Meehan, Max |
| author_facet | Bai, Yuehao Huang, Shunzhuang Tabord-Meehan, Max |
| contents | This paper studies a potential outcome model with a continuous or discrete outcome, a discrete multi-valued treatment, and a discrete multi-valued instrument. We derive sharp, closed-form testable implications for a class of restrictions on potential treatments where each value of the instrument encourages towards at most one unique treatment choice; such restrictions serve as the key identifying assumption in several prominent recent empirical papers. Borrowing the terminology used in randomized experiments, we call such a setting an encouragement design. The testable implications are inequalities in terms of the conditional distributions of choices and the outcome given the instrument. Through a novel constructive argument, we show these inequalities are sharp in the sense that any distribution of the observed data that satisfies these inequalities is compatible with this class of restrictions on potential treatments. Based on these inequalities, we propose tests of the restrictions. In an empirical application, we show some of these restrictions are violated and pinpoint the substitution pattern that leads to the violation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_09808 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Sharp Testable Implications of Encouragement Designs Bai, Yuehao Huang, Shunzhuang Tabord-Meehan, Max Econometrics This paper studies a potential outcome model with a continuous or discrete outcome, a discrete multi-valued treatment, and a discrete multi-valued instrument. We derive sharp, closed-form testable implications for a class of restrictions on potential treatments where each value of the instrument encourages towards at most one unique treatment choice; such restrictions serve as the key identifying assumption in several prominent recent empirical papers. Borrowing the terminology used in randomized experiments, we call such a setting an encouragement design. The testable implications are inequalities in terms of the conditional distributions of choices and the outcome given the instrument. Through a novel constructive argument, we show these inequalities are sharp in the sense that any distribution of the observed data that satisfies these inequalities is compatible with this class of restrictions on potential treatments. Based on these inequalities, we propose tests of the restrictions. In an empirical application, we show some of these restrictions are violated and pinpoint the substitution pattern that leads to the violation. |
| title | Sharp Testable Implications of Encouragement Designs |
| topic | Econometrics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.09808 |