A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adoptions
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866912538381254656 |
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| author | Highsmith, Terence |
| author_facet | Highsmith, Terence |
| contents | Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design mechanisms satisfying fairness and limited strategy-proofness. They also avoid costly patience. Our empirically-based simulations suggest the mechanisms could increase adoptions by at least 25% versus the status quo. A naive dynamic extension of Deferred Acceptance does not attain these benefits. Our mechanisms sidestep direct preference elicitation by predicting preferences, and they are robust to prediction error. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_09817 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adoptions Highsmith, Terence Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design mechanisms satisfying fairness and limited strategy-proofness. They also avoid costly patience. Our empirically-based simulations suggest the mechanisms could increase adoptions by at least 25% versus the status quo. A naive dynamic extension of Deferred Acceptance does not attain these benefits. Our mechanisms sidestep direct preference elicitation by predicting preferences, and they are robust to prediction error. |
| title | A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adoptions |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.09817 |