Teapot: Efficiently Uncovering Spectre Gadgets in COTS Binaries
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866910764080562176 |
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| author | Lin, Fangzheng Wang, Zhongfa Sasaki, Hiroshi |
| author_facet | Lin, Fangzheng Wang, Zhongfa Sasaki, Hiroshi |
| contents | Speculative execution is crucial in enhancing modern processor performance but can introduce Spectre-type vulnerabilities that may leak sensitive information. Detecting Spectre gadgets from programs has been a research focus to enhance the analysis and understanding of Spectre attacks. However, one of the problems of existing approaches is that they rely on the presence of source code (or are impractical in terms of run-time performance and gadget detection ability).
This paper presents Teapot, the first Spectre gadget scanner that works on COTS binaries with comparable performance to compiler-based alternatives. As its core principle, we introduce Speculation Shadows, a novel approach that separates the binary code for normal execution and speculation simulation in order to improve run-time efficiency.
Teapot is based on static binary rewriting. It instruments the program to simulate the effects of speculative execution and also adds integrity checks to detect Spectre gadgets at run time. By leveraging fuzzing, Teapot succeeds in efficiently detecting Spectre gadgets. Evaluations show that Teapot outperforms both performance (more than 20x performant) and gadget detection ability than a previously proposed binary-based approach. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_11624 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Teapot: Efficiently Uncovering Spectre Gadgets in COTS Binaries Lin, Fangzheng Wang, Zhongfa Sasaki, Hiroshi Cryptography and Security Hardware Architecture Speculative execution is crucial in enhancing modern processor performance but can introduce Spectre-type vulnerabilities that may leak sensitive information. Detecting Spectre gadgets from programs has been a research focus to enhance the analysis and understanding of Spectre attacks. However, one of the problems of existing approaches is that they rely on the presence of source code (or are impractical in terms of run-time performance and gadget detection ability). This paper presents Teapot, the first Spectre gadget scanner that works on COTS binaries with comparable performance to compiler-based alternatives. As its core principle, we introduce Speculation Shadows, a novel approach that separates the binary code for normal execution and speculation simulation in order to improve run-time efficiency. Teapot is based on static binary rewriting. It instruments the program to simulate the effects of speculative execution and also adds integrity checks to detect Spectre gadgets at run time. By leveraging fuzzing, Teapot succeeds in efficiently detecting Spectre gadgets. Evaluations show that Teapot outperforms both performance (more than 20x performant) and gadget detection ability than a previously proposed binary-based approach. |
| title | Teapot: Efficiently Uncovering Spectre Gadgets in COTS Binaries |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Hardware Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.11624 |