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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.12562 |
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| _version_ | 1866913583232712704 |
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| author | Natal, Joseph |
| author_facet | Natal, Joseph |
| contents | Wolfram's hypergraph dynamics should replace outmoded models in physics. This should even more so be the case if experimental evidence for the theory is found (which I believe is probable). However, due to the breadth and depth of the theory, it may be difficult to produce experimental evidence which falsifies it. Some of Wolfram's personal work relating to his physics project is philosophical, and so mechanics of particular phenomena in the natural world can become a triviality or an aside. In other words, the general theory "casts a wide net", and it is the philosophical topics I will challenge. I find that Wolfram must adopt a radical epistemology through his so-called Observer Theory because there is no clear notion of Truth. Tegmark believes in an objective Truth, but I find its relation to the observer untenable, and the proof of his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) is gematria. I argue both Wolfram and Tegmark conflate the inherent potential of mathematical truths with their instantiation or actuality in reality, making a similar error to that of the "so-called" Pythagoreans rebuked by Aristotle. Nonetheless, I believe that combinatorial structures of the kind used in the physics project (abstract rewriting, directed acyclic graphs) will be the future of physics as we know it. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_12562 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Refuting the Metaphysics of Wolfram and Tegmark Natal, Joseph History and Philosophy of Physics Wolfram's hypergraph dynamics should replace outmoded models in physics. This should even more so be the case if experimental evidence for the theory is found (which I believe is probable). However, due to the breadth and depth of the theory, it may be difficult to produce experimental evidence which falsifies it. Some of Wolfram's personal work relating to his physics project is philosophical, and so mechanics of particular phenomena in the natural world can become a triviality or an aside. In other words, the general theory "casts a wide net", and it is the philosophical topics I will challenge. I find that Wolfram must adopt a radical epistemology through his so-called Observer Theory because there is no clear notion of Truth. Tegmark believes in an objective Truth, but I find its relation to the observer untenable, and the proof of his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) is gematria. I argue both Wolfram and Tegmark conflate the inherent potential of mathematical truths with their instantiation or actuality in reality, making a similar error to that of the "so-called" Pythagoreans rebuked by Aristotle. Nonetheless, I believe that combinatorial structures of the kind used in the physics project (abstract rewriting, directed acyclic graphs) will be the future of physics as we know it. |
| title | Refuting the Metaphysics of Wolfram and Tegmark |
| topic | History and Philosophy of Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.12562 |