Inconsistency and Acausality in Bayesian Inference for Physical Problems

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Mosegaard, Klaus, Curtis, Andrew
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Mosegaard, Klaus
Curtis, Andrew
author_facet Mosegaard, Klaus
Curtis, Andrew
contents Bayesian inference is used to estimate continuous parameter values given measured data in many fields of science. The method relies on conditional probability densities to describe information about both data and parameters, yet the notion of conditional densities is inadmissible: probabilities of the same physical event, computed from conditional densities under different parameterizations, may be inconsistent. We show that this inconsistency, together with acausality in hierarchical methods, invalidate a variety of commonly applied Bayesian methods when applied to problems in the physical world, including trans-dimensional inference, general Bayesian dimensionality reduction methods, and hierarchical and empirical Bayes. Models in parameter spaces of different dimensionalities cannot be compared, invalidating the concept of natural parsimony, the probabilistic counterpart to Occams Razor. Bayes theorem itself is inadmissible, and Bayesian inference applied to parameters that characterize physical properties requires reformulation.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_13570
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Inconsistency and Acausality in Bayesian Inference for Physical Problems
Mosegaard, Klaus
Curtis, Andrew
Methodology
Data Analysis, Statistics and Probability
60-08, 62C10, 62C12, 62F15
G.3
Bayesian inference is used to estimate continuous parameter values given measured data in many fields of science. The method relies on conditional probability densities to describe information about both data and parameters, yet the notion of conditional densities is inadmissible: probabilities of the same physical event, computed from conditional densities under different parameterizations, may be inconsistent. We show that this inconsistency, together with acausality in hierarchical methods, invalidate a variety of commonly applied Bayesian methods when applied to problems in the physical world, including trans-dimensional inference, general Bayesian dimensionality reduction methods, and hierarchical and empirical Bayes. Models in parameter spaces of different dimensionalities cannot be compared, invalidating the concept of natural parsimony, the probabilistic counterpart to Occams Razor. Bayes theorem itself is inadmissible, and Bayesian inference applied to parameters that characterize physical properties requires reformulation.
title Inconsistency and Acausality in Bayesian Inference for Physical Problems
topic Methodology
Data Analysis, Statistics and Probability
60-08, 62C10, 62C12, 62F15
G.3
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.13570