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Distortion of Multi-Winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison Rule

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Babashah, Negar, Karimi, Hasti, Seddighin, Masoud, Shahkarami, Golnoosh
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2024
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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