Privacy-Preserving Power Flow Analysis via Secure Multi-Party Computation
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866913583405727744 |
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| author | von der Heyden, Jonas Schlüter, Nils Binfet, Philipp Asman, Martin Zdrallek, Markus Jager, Tibor Darup, Moritz Schulze |
| author_facet | von der Heyden, Jonas Schlüter, Nils Binfet, Philipp Asman, Martin Zdrallek, Markus Jager, Tibor Darup, Moritz Schulze |
| contents | Smart grids feature a bidirectional flow of electricity and data, enhancing flexibility, efficiency, and reliability in increasingly volatile energy grids. However, data from smart meters can reveal sensitive private information. Consequently, the adoption of smart meters is often restricted via legal means and hampered by limited user acceptance. Since metering data is beneficial for fault-free grid operation, power management, and resource allocation, applying privacy-preserving techniques to smart metering data is an important research problem. This work addresses this by using secure multi-party computation (SMPC), allowing multiple parties to jointly evaluate functions of their private inputs without revealing the latter. Concretely, we show how to perform power flow analysis on cryptographically hidden prosumer data. More precisely, we present a tailored solution to the power flow problem building on an SMPC implementation of Newtons method. We analyze the security of our approach in the universal composability framework and provide benchmarks for various grid types, threat models, and solvers. Our results indicate that secure multi-party computation can be able to alleviate privacy issues in smart grids in certain applications. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_14557 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Privacy-Preserving Power Flow Analysis via Secure Multi-Party Computation von der Heyden, Jonas Schlüter, Nils Binfet, Philipp Asman, Martin Zdrallek, Markus Jager, Tibor Darup, Moritz Schulze Cryptography and Security Systems and Control Smart grids feature a bidirectional flow of electricity and data, enhancing flexibility, efficiency, and reliability in increasingly volatile energy grids. However, data from smart meters can reveal sensitive private information. Consequently, the adoption of smart meters is often restricted via legal means and hampered by limited user acceptance. Since metering data is beneficial for fault-free grid operation, power management, and resource allocation, applying privacy-preserving techniques to smart metering data is an important research problem. This work addresses this by using secure multi-party computation (SMPC), allowing multiple parties to jointly evaluate functions of their private inputs without revealing the latter. Concretely, we show how to perform power flow analysis on cryptographically hidden prosumer data. More precisely, we present a tailored solution to the power flow problem building on an SMPC implementation of Newtons method. We analyze the security of our approach in the universal composability framework and provide benchmarks for various grid types, threat models, and solvers. Our results indicate that secure multi-party computation can be able to alleviate privacy issues in smart grids in certain applications. |
| title | Privacy-Preserving Power Flow Analysis via Secure Multi-Party Computation |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.14557 |