Guarding the Gate: ConceptGuard Battles Concept-Level Backdoors in Concept Bottleneck Models
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866912132395696128 |
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| author | Lai, Songning Huang, Yu Yang, Jiayu Huang, Gaoxiang Chen, Wenshuo Yue, Yutao |
| author_facet | Lai, Songning Huang, Yu Yang, Jiayu Huang, Gaoxiang Chen, Wenshuo Yue, Yutao |
| contents | The increasing complexity of AI models, especially in deep learning, has raised concerns about transparency and accountability, particularly in high-stakes applications like medical diagnostics, where opaque models can undermine trust. Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) aims to address these issues by providing clear, interpretable models. Among XAI techniques, Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) enhance transparency by using high-level semantic concepts. However, CBMs are vulnerable to concept-level backdoor attacks, which inject hidden triggers into these concepts, leading to undetectable anomalous behavior. To address this critical security gap, we introduce ConceptGuard, a novel defense framework specifically designed to protect CBMs from concept-level backdoor attacks. ConceptGuard employs a multi-stage approach, including concept clustering based on text distance measurements and a voting mechanism among classifiers trained on different concept subgroups, to isolate and mitigate potential triggers. Our contributions are threefold: (i) we present ConceptGuard as the first defense mechanism tailored for concept-level backdoor attacks in CBMs; (ii) we provide theoretical guarantees that ConceptGuard can effectively defend against such attacks within a certain trigger size threshold, ensuring robustness; and (iii) we demonstrate that ConceptGuard maintains the high performance and interpretability of CBMs, crucial for trustworthiness. Through comprehensive experiments and theoretical proofs, we show that ConceptGuard significantly enhances the security and trustworthiness of CBMs, paving the way for their secure deployment in critical applications. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_16512 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Guarding the Gate: ConceptGuard Battles Concept-Level Backdoors in Concept Bottleneck Models Lai, Songning Huang, Yu Yang, Jiayu Huang, Gaoxiang Chen, Wenshuo Yue, Yutao Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition The increasing complexity of AI models, especially in deep learning, has raised concerns about transparency and accountability, particularly in high-stakes applications like medical diagnostics, where opaque models can undermine trust. Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) aims to address these issues by providing clear, interpretable models. Among XAI techniques, Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) enhance transparency by using high-level semantic concepts. However, CBMs are vulnerable to concept-level backdoor attacks, which inject hidden triggers into these concepts, leading to undetectable anomalous behavior. To address this critical security gap, we introduce ConceptGuard, a novel defense framework specifically designed to protect CBMs from concept-level backdoor attacks. ConceptGuard employs a multi-stage approach, including concept clustering based on text distance measurements and a voting mechanism among classifiers trained on different concept subgroups, to isolate and mitigate potential triggers. Our contributions are threefold: (i) we present ConceptGuard as the first defense mechanism tailored for concept-level backdoor attacks in CBMs; (ii) we provide theoretical guarantees that ConceptGuard can effectively defend against such attacks within a certain trigger size threshold, ensuring robustness; and (iii) we demonstrate that ConceptGuard maintains the high performance and interpretability of CBMs, crucial for trustworthiness. Through comprehensive experiments and theoretical proofs, we show that ConceptGuard significantly enhances the security and trustworthiness of CBMs, paving the way for their secure deployment in critical applications. |
| title | Guarding the Gate: ConceptGuard Battles Concept-Level Backdoors in Concept Bottleneck Models |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.16512 |