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| Autori principali: | , , , , , , , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
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2024
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| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.17693 |
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| _version_ | 1866916496816472064 |
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| author | Wen, Jiaxin Hebbar, Vivek Larson, Caleb Bhatt, Aryan Radhakrishnan, Ansh Sharma, Mrinank Sleight, Henry Feng, Shi He, He Perez, Ethan Shlegeris, Buck Khan, Akbir |
| author_facet | Wen, Jiaxin Hebbar, Vivek Larson, Caleb Bhatt, Aryan Radhakrishnan, Ansh Sharma, Mrinank Sleight, Henry Feng, Shi He, He Perez, Ethan Shlegeris, Buck Khan, Akbir |
| contents | As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_17693 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Adaptive Deployment of Untrusted LLMs Reduces Distributed Threats Wen, Jiaxin Hebbar, Vivek Larson, Caleb Bhatt, Aryan Radhakrishnan, Ansh Sharma, Mrinank Sleight, Henry Feng, Shi He, He Perez, Ethan Shlegeris, Buck Khan, Akbir Computation and Language As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines. |
| title | Adaptive Deployment of Untrusted LLMs Reduces Distributed Threats |
| topic | Computation and Language |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.17693 |