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Main Authors: Qiu, Yuyang, Yousefian, Farzad, Zhang, Brian
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.18883
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author Qiu, Yuyang
Yousefian, Farzad
Zhang, Brian
author_facet Qiu, Yuyang
Yousefian, Farzad
Zhang, Brian
contents In noncooperative Nash games, equilibria are often inefficient. This is exemplified by the Prisoner's Dilemma and was first provably shown in the 1980s. Since then, understanding the quality of Nash equilibrium (NE) received considerable attention, leading to the emergence of inefficiency measures characterized by the best or the worst equilibrium. Traditionally, computing an optimal NE in monotone regimes is done through two-loop schemes which lack scalability and provable performance guarantees. The goal in this work lies in the development of among the first single-timescale distributed gradient tracking optimization methods for optimal NE seeking over networks. Our main contributions are as follows. By employing a regularization-based relaxation approach within two existing distributed gradient tracking methods, namely Push-Pull and DSGT, we devise and analyze two single-timescale iteratively regularized gradient tracking algorithms. The first method addresses computing the optimal NE over directed networks, while the second method addresses a stochastic variant of this problem over undirected networks. For both methods, we establish the convergence to the optimal NE and derive new convergence rate statements for the consensus error of the generated iterates. We provide preliminary numerical results on a Nash-Cournot game.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_18883
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Iteratively Regularized Gradient Tracking Methods for Optimal Equilibrium Seeking
Qiu, Yuyang
Yousefian, Farzad
Zhang, Brian
Optimization and Control
In noncooperative Nash games, equilibria are often inefficient. This is exemplified by the Prisoner's Dilemma and was first provably shown in the 1980s. Since then, understanding the quality of Nash equilibrium (NE) received considerable attention, leading to the emergence of inefficiency measures characterized by the best or the worst equilibrium. Traditionally, computing an optimal NE in monotone regimes is done through two-loop schemes which lack scalability and provable performance guarantees. The goal in this work lies in the development of among the first single-timescale distributed gradient tracking optimization methods for optimal NE seeking over networks. Our main contributions are as follows. By employing a regularization-based relaxation approach within two existing distributed gradient tracking methods, namely Push-Pull and DSGT, we devise and analyze two single-timescale iteratively regularized gradient tracking algorithms. The first method addresses computing the optimal NE over directed networks, while the second method addresses a stochastic variant of this problem over undirected networks. For both methods, we establish the convergence to the optimal NE and derive new convergence rate statements for the consensus error of the generated iterates. We provide preliminary numerical results on a Nash-Cournot game.
title Iteratively Regularized Gradient Tracking Methods for Optimal Equilibrium Seeking
topic Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.18883