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Good election rules with more than three candidates are Borda

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Gendler, Gabriel
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Combinatorics 91B14, 91B12
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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