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Hauptverfasser: Liu, Yi, Yu, Yang
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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Online-Zugang:https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.19431
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author Liu, Yi
Yu, Yang
author_facet Liu, Yi
Yu, Yang
contents This paper explores the problem of mediated communication enhanced by money-burning tactics for commitment power. In our model, the sender has state-independent preferences and can design a communication mechanism that both transmits messages and burns money. We characterize the sender's maximum equilibrium payoff, which has clear geometric interpretations and is linked to two types of robust Bayesian persuasion. We demonstrate that, generically, the money-burning tactic \emph{strictly} improves the sender's payoff for almost all prior beliefs where commitment is valuable for the sender. Furthermore, our communication model directly applies to Web 3.0 communities, clarifying the commitment value within these contexts.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2411_19431
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Money Burning Improves Mediated Communication
Liu, Yi
Yu, Yang
Theoretical Economics
This paper explores the problem of mediated communication enhanced by money-burning tactics for commitment power. In our model, the sender has state-independent preferences and can design a communication mechanism that both transmits messages and burns money. We characterize the sender's maximum equilibrium payoff, which has clear geometric interpretations and is linked to two types of robust Bayesian persuasion. We demonstrate that, generically, the money-burning tactic \emph{strictly} improves the sender's payoff for almost all prior beliefs where commitment is valuable for the sender. Furthermore, our communication model directly applies to Web 3.0 communities, clarifying the commitment value within these contexts.
title Money Burning Improves Mediated Communication
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.19431