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Achieving PAC Guarantees in Mechanism Design through Multi-Armed Bandits

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Osogami, Takayuki, Kinoshita, Hirota, Wasserkrug, Segev
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Machine Learning
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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