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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Lahr, Patrick, Niemeyer, Axel
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.00649
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