Capacity Constraints in Principal-Agent Problems
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866912141054836736 |
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| author | Clark, Aubrey |
| author_facet | Clark, Aubrey |
| contents | Adding a capacity constraint to a hidden-action principal-agent problem results in the same set of Pareto optimal contracts as the unconstrained problem where output is scaled down by a constant factor. This scaling factor is increasing in the agent's capacity to exert effort. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_01760 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Capacity Constraints in Principal-Agent Problems Clark, Aubrey Theoretical Economics Adding a capacity constraint to a hidden-action principal-agent problem results in the same set of Pareto optimal contracts as the unconstrained problem where output is scaled down by a constant factor. This scaling factor is increasing in the agent's capacity to exert effort. |
| title | Capacity Constraints in Principal-Agent Problems |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.01760 |