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Hauptverfasser: Peppin, Aidan, Reuel, Anka, Casper, Stephen, Jones, Elliot, Strait, Andrew, Anwar, Usman, Agrawal, Anurag, Kapoor, Sayash, Koyejo, Sanmi, Pellat, Marie, Bommasani, Rishi, Frosst, Nick, Hooker, Sara
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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Online-Zugang:https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.01946
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author Peppin, Aidan
Reuel, Anka
Casper, Stephen
Jones, Elliot
Strait, Andrew
Anwar, Usman
Agrawal, Anurag
Kapoor, Sayash
Koyejo, Sanmi
Pellat, Marie
Bommasani, Rishi
Frosst, Nick
Hooker, Sara
author_facet Peppin, Aidan
Reuel, Anka
Casper, Stephen
Jones, Elliot
Strait, Andrew
Anwar, Usman
Agrawal, Anurag
Kapoor, Sayash
Koyejo, Sanmi
Pellat, Marie
Bommasani, Rishi
Frosst, Nick
Hooker, Sara
contents To accurately and confidently answer the question 'could an AI model or system increase biorisk', it is necessary to have both a sound theoretical threat model for how AI models or systems could increase biorisk and a robust method for testing that threat model. This paper provides an analysis of existing available research surrounding two AI and biorisk threat models: 1) access to information and planning via large language models (LLMs), and 2) the use of AI-enabled biological tools (BTs) in synthesizing novel biological artifacts. We find that existing studies around AI-related biorisk are nascent, often speculative in nature, or limited in terms of their methodological maturity and transparency. The available literature suggests that current LLMs and BTs do not pose an immediate risk, and more work is needed to develop rigorous approaches to understanding how future models could increase biorisks. We end with recommendations about how empirical work can be expanded to more precisely target biorisk and ensure rigor and validity of findings.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_01946
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The Reality of AI and Biorisk
Peppin, Aidan
Reuel, Anka
Casper, Stephen
Jones, Elliot
Strait, Andrew
Anwar, Usman
Agrawal, Anurag
Kapoor, Sayash
Koyejo, Sanmi
Pellat, Marie
Bommasani, Rishi
Frosst, Nick
Hooker, Sara
Artificial Intelligence
To accurately and confidently answer the question 'could an AI model or system increase biorisk', it is necessary to have both a sound theoretical threat model for how AI models or systems could increase biorisk and a robust method for testing that threat model. This paper provides an analysis of existing available research surrounding two AI and biorisk threat models: 1) access to information and planning via large language models (LLMs), and 2) the use of AI-enabled biological tools (BTs) in synthesizing novel biological artifacts. We find that existing studies around AI-related biorisk are nascent, often speculative in nature, or limited in terms of their methodological maturity and transparency. The available literature suggests that current LLMs and BTs do not pose an immediate risk, and more work is needed to develop rigorous approaches to understanding how future models could increase biorisks. We end with recommendations about how empirical work can be expanded to more precisely target biorisk and ensure rigor and validity of findings.
title The Reality of AI and Biorisk
topic Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.01946