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Main Authors: Xu, Yongjie, Chen, Guangke, Song, Fu, Chen, Yuqi
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.03993
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author Xu, Yongjie
Chen, Guangke
Song, Fu
Chen, Yuqi
author_facet Xu, Yongjie
Chen, Guangke
Song, Fu
Chen, Yuqi
contents Backdoor attacks embed hidden associations between triggers and targets in deep neural networks (DNNs), causing them to predict the target when a trigger is present while maintaining normal behavior otherwise. Physical backdoor attacks, which use physical objects as triggers, are feasible but lack remote control, temporal stealthiness, flexibility, and mobility. To overcome these limitations, in this work, we propose a new type of backdoor triggers utilizing lasers that feature long-distance transmission and instant-imaging properties. Based on the laser-based backdoor triggers, we present a physical backdoor attack, called LaserGuider, which possesses remote control ability and achieves high temporal stealthiness, flexibility, and mobility. We also introduce a systematic approach to optimize laser parameters for improving attack effectiveness. Our evaluation on traffic sign recognition DNNs, critical in autonomous vehicles, demonstrates that LaserGuider with three different laser-based triggers achieves over 90% attack success rate with negligible impact on normal inputs. Additionally, we release LaserMark, the first dataset of real world traffic signs stamped with physical laser spots, to support further research in backdoor attacks and defenses.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_03993
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle LaserGuider: A Laser Based Physical Backdoor Attack against Deep Neural Networks
Xu, Yongjie
Chen, Guangke
Song, Fu
Chen, Yuqi
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Machine Learning
Image and Video Processing
Backdoor attacks embed hidden associations between triggers and targets in deep neural networks (DNNs), causing them to predict the target when a trigger is present while maintaining normal behavior otherwise. Physical backdoor attacks, which use physical objects as triggers, are feasible but lack remote control, temporal stealthiness, flexibility, and mobility. To overcome these limitations, in this work, we propose a new type of backdoor triggers utilizing lasers that feature long-distance transmission and instant-imaging properties. Based on the laser-based backdoor triggers, we present a physical backdoor attack, called LaserGuider, which possesses remote control ability and achieves high temporal stealthiness, flexibility, and mobility. We also introduce a systematic approach to optimize laser parameters for improving attack effectiveness. Our evaluation on traffic sign recognition DNNs, critical in autonomous vehicles, demonstrates that LaserGuider with three different laser-based triggers achieves over 90% attack success rate with negligible impact on normal inputs. Additionally, we release LaserMark, the first dataset of real world traffic signs stamped with physical laser spots, to support further research in backdoor attacks and defenses.
title LaserGuider: A Laser Based Physical Backdoor Attack against Deep Neural Networks
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Machine Learning
Image and Video Processing
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.03993