FlexLLM: Exploring LLM Customization for Moving Target Defense on Black-Box LLMs Against Jailbreak Attacks

Fuente: arXiv
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Chen, Bocheng, Guo, Hanqing, Yan, Qiben
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
_version_ 1866912150803447808
author Chen, Bocheng
Guo, Hanqing
Yan, Qiben
author_facet Chen, Bocheng
Guo, Hanqing
Yan, Qiben
contents Defense in large language models (LLMs) is crucial to counter the numerous attackers exploiting these systems to generate harmful content through manipulated prompts, known as jailbreak attacks. Although many defense strategies have been proposed, they often require access to the model's internal structure or need additional training, which is impractical for service providers using LLM APIs, such as OpenAI APIs or Claude APIs. In this paper, we propose a moving target defense approach that alters decoding hyperparameters to enhance model robustness against various jailbreak attacks. Our approach does not require access to the model's internal structure and incurs no additional training costs. The proposed defense includes two key components: (1) optimizing the decoding strategy by identifying and adjusting decoding hyperparameters that influence token generation probabilities, and (2) transforming the decoding hyperparameters and model system prompts into dynamic targets, which are continuously altered during each runtime. By continuously modifying decoding strategies and prompts, the defense effectively mitigates the existing attacks. Our results demonstrate that our defense is the most effective against jailbreak attacks in three of the models tested when using LLMs as black-box APIs. Moreover, our defense offers lower inference costs and maintains comparable response quality, making it a potential layer of protection when used alongside other defense methods.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_07672
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle FlexLLM: Exploring LLM Customization for Moving Target Defense on Black-Box LLMs Against Jailbreak Attacks
Chen, Bocheng
Guo, Hanqing
Yan, Qiben
Cryptography and Security
Computation and Language
Defense in large language models (LLMs) is crucial to counter the numerous attackers exploiting these systems to generate harmful content through manipulated prompts, known as jailbreak attacks. Although many defense strategies have been proposed, they often require access to the model's internal structure or need additional training, which is impractical for service providers using LLM APIs, such as OpenAI APIs or Claude APIs. In this paper, we propose a moving target defense approach that alters decoding hyperparameters to enhance model robustness against various jailbreak attacks. Our approach does not require access to the model's internal structure and incurs no additional training costs. The proposed defense includes two key components: (1) optimizing the decoding strategy by identifying and adjusting decoding hyperparameters that influence token generation probabilities, and (2) transforming the decoding hyperparameters and model system prompts into dynamic targets, which are continuously altered during each runtime. By continuously modifying decoding strategies and prompts, the defense effectively mitigates the existing attacks. Our results demonstrate that our defense is the most effective against jailbreak attacks in three of the models tested when using LLMs as black-box APIs. Moreover, our defense offers lower inference costs and maintains comparable response quality, making it a potential layer of protection when used alongside other defense methods.
title FlexLLM: Exploring LLM Customization for Moving Target Defense on Black-Box LLMs Against Jailbreak Attacks
topic Cryptography and Security
Computation and Language
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.07672