Approximate Revenue from Finite Range Mechanisms
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913607764148224 |
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| author | Goswami, Mridu Prabal |
| author_facet | Goswami, Mridu Prabal |
| contents | We consider an economic environment where a seller wants to sell an indivisible unit of good to a buyer. We show that revenue from any strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism defined on closed intervals of rich single crossing domains considered in \citep{Goswami1}, can be approximated by the revenue from a sequence of strategy-proof and individually rational mechanisms with finite range. Thus while studying optimal mechanisms without loss of generality we can study mechanisms with finite range. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_08342 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Approximate Revenue from Finite Range Mechanisms Goswami, Mridu Prabal Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics 54-08 I.2.0 We consider an economic environment where a seller wants to sell an indivisible unit of good to a buyer. We show that revenue from any strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism defined on closed intervals of rich single crossing domains considered in \citep{Goswami1}, can be approximated by the revenue from a sequence of strategy-proof and individually rational mechanisms with finite range. Thus while studying optimal mechanisms without loss of generality we can study mechanisms with finite range. |
| title | Approximate Revenue from Finite Range Mechanisms |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics 54-08 I.2.0 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.08342 |