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A composition of Condorcet domains

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Keehan, Dominic, Slinko, Arkadii
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Combinatorics 91B14
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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