Strategic Attribute Learning
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866914171029815296 |
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| author | Benkert, Jean-Michel Matyskova, Ludmila Starkov, Egor |
| author_facet | Benkert, Jean-Michel Matyskova, Ludmila Starkov, Egor |
| contents | A researcher allocates a budget of informative tests across multiple unknown attributes to influence a decision-maker. We derive the researcher's equilibrium learning strategy by solving an auxiliary single-player problem. The attribute weights in this problem depend on how much the researcher and the decision-maker disagree. If the researcher expects an excessive response to new information, she forgoes learning altogether. In an organizational context, we show that a manager favors more diverse analysts as the hierarchical distance grows. In another application, we show how an appropriately opposed advisor can constrain a discriminatory politician, and identify the welfare-inequality Pareto frontier of researchers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_10024 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Attribute Learning Benkert, Jean-Michel Matyskova, Ludmila Starkov, Egor Theoretical Economics A researcher allocates a budget of informative tests across multiple unknown attributes to influence a decision-maker. We derive the researcher's equilibrium learning strategy by solving an auxiliary single-player problem. The attribute weights in this problem depend on how much the researcher and the decision-maker disagree. If the researcher expects an excessive response to new information, she forgoes learning altogether. In an organizational context, we show that a manager favors more diverse analysts as the hierarchical distance grows. In another application, we show how an appropriately opposed advisor can constrain a discriminatory politician, and identify the welfare-inequality Pareto frontier of researchers. |
| title | Strategic Attribute Learning |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.10024 |