Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866915346871484416 |
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| author | Wiesemann, Jerome Grünenfelder, Fadri Blázquez, Ana Walenta, Nino Rusca, Davide |
| author_facet | Wiesemann, Jerome Grünenfelder, Fadri Blázquez, Ana Walenta, Nino Rusca, Davide |
| contents | While ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are well-understood, practical implementations face various vulnerabilities, such as side-channel attacks resulting from device imperfections. Current security proofs for decoy-state BB84 protocols either assume uniform phase randomization of Alice's signals, which is compromised by practical limitations and attacks like injection locking, or rely on a (partially) characterized phase distribution. This work presents an experimental method to characterize the phase de-randomization from injection locking using a heterodyne detection setup, providing a lower bound on the degree of isolation required to protect QKD transmitters against injection-locking attacks. The methods presented are source-agnostic and can be used to evaluate general QKD systems against injection-locking attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_10290 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks Wiesemann, Jerome Grünenfelder, Fadri Blázquez, Ana Walenta, Nino Rusca, Davide Quantum Physics While ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are well-understood, practical implementations face various vulnerabilities, such as side-channel attacks resulting from device imperfections. Current security proofs for decoy-state BB84 protocols either assume uniform phase randomization of Alice's signals, which is compromised by practical limitations and attacks like injection locking, or rely on a (partially) characterized phase distribution. This work presents an experimental method to characterize the phase de-randomization from injection locking using a heterodyne detection setup, providing a lower bound on the degree of isolation required to protect QKD transmitters against injection-locking attacks. The methods presented are source-agnostic and can be used to evaluate general QKD systems against injection-locking attacks. |
| title | Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.10290 |