Frege on the reference of sentences

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Author: Rodrigues, Abilio
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Rodrigues, Abilio
author_facet Rodrigues, Abilio
contents The aim of this paper is to show that Frege's argument which concluded that the reference of a sentence is its truth-value, presented in 'On Sense and Reference' (1892), can be reconstructed taking into account the problems of the notion of conceptual content presented in the 'Begriffsschrift' (1879) and also other passages from a letter to Russell (1902) and the posthumous 'Logic in Mathematics' (1914). Once the `hybrid' notion of conceptual content was rejected as the semantic value of the expressions of the formal language designed to carry out the logicist project, there was no alternative between truth-values and thoughts. I claim that the reconstructed argument is perfectly sound and convincing.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_10585
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Frege on the reference of sentences
Rodrigues, Abilio
Logic
The aim of this paper is to show that Frege's argument which concluded that the reference of a sentence is its truth-value, presented in 'On Sense and Reference' (1892), can be reconstructed taking into account the problems of the notion of conceptual content presented in the 'Begriffsschrift' (1879) and also other passages from a letter to Russell (1902) and the posthumous 'Logic in Mathematics' (1914). Once the `hybrid' notion of conceptual content was rejected as the semantic value of the expressions of the formal language designed to carry out the logicist project, there was no alternative between truth-values and thoughts. I claim that the reconstructed argument is perfectly sound and convincing.
title Frege on the reference of sentences
topic Logic
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.10585