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Optimal Strategy-proof Mechanisms on Single-crossing Domains

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Goswami, Mridu Prabal
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics 54-08 I.2.0
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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