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Paid with Models: Optimal Contract Design for Collaborative Machine Learning

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Wang, Bingchen, Wu, Zhaoxuan, Liu, Fusheng, Low, Bryan Kian Hsiang
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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