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Neural Double Auction Mechanism

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Suehara, Tsuyoshi, Takeuchi, Koh, Kashima, Hisashi, Oyama, Satoshi, Sakurai, Yuko, Yokoo, Makoto
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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