Quantifying Inefficiency
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866915785354510336 |
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| author | Gonczarowski, Yannai A. Segev, Ella |
| author_facet | Gonczarowski, Yannai A. Segev, Ella |
| contents | We axiomatically define a cardinal social inefficiency function, which, given a set of alternatives and individuals' vNM preferences over the alternatives, assigns a unique number -- the social inefficiency -- to each alternative. These numbers -- and not only their order -- are uniquely defined by our axioms despite no exogenously given interpersonal comparison, outside option, or disagreement point. We interpret these numbers as per-capita losses in endogenously normalized utility. We apply our social inefficiency function to a setting in which interpersonal comparison is notoriously hard to justify -- object allocation without money -- leveraging techniques from computer science to prove an approximate-efficiency result for the Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_11984 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Quantifying Inefficiency Gonczarowski, Yannai A. Segev, Ella Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We axiomatically define a cardinal social inefficiency function, which, given a set of alternatives and individuals' vNM preferences over the alternatives, assigns a unique number -- the social inefficiency -- to each alternative. These numbers -- and not only their order -- are uniquely defined by our axioms despite no exogenously given interpersonal comparison, outside option, or disagreement point. We interpret these numbers as per-capita losses in endogenously normalized utility. We apply our social inefficiency function to a setting in which interpersonal comparison is notoriously hard to justify -- object allocation without money -- leveraging techniques from computer science to prove an approximate-efficiency result for the Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism. |
| title | Quantifying Inefficiency |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.11984 |