Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule
Fuente:
arXiv
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1866917870856830976 |
|---|---|
| author | Arribillaga, R. Pablo Bonifacio, Agustin G. |
| author_facet | Arribillaga, R. Pablo Bonifacio, Agustin G. |
| contents | In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, the equal division guarantee, consistency, and non-obvious manipulability. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_12495 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule Arribillaga, R. Pablo Bonifacio, Agustin G. Theoretical Economics In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, the equal division guarantee, consistency, and non-obvious manipulability. |
| title | Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.12495 |