Why does time feel the way it does? Towards a principled account of temporal experience
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866912160150454272 |
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| author | Comolatti, Renzo Grasso, Matteo Tononi, Giulio |
| author_facet | Comolatti, Renzo Grasso, Matteo Tononi, Giulio |
| contents | Time flows, or at least the time of our experience does. Can we provide an objective account of why experience, confined to the short window of the conscious present, encompasses a succession of moments that slip away from now to then--an account of why time feels flowing? Integrated Information Theory (IIT) aims to account for both the presence and quality of consciousness in objective, physical terms. Given a substrate's architecture and current state, the formalism of IIT allows one to unfold the cause-effect power of the substrate, yielding a cause-effect structure. According to IIT, this accounts in full for the presence and quality of experience, without any additional ingredients. In previous work, we showed how unfolding the cause-effect structure of non-directed grids, like those found in many posterior cortical areas, can account for the way space feels--namely, extended. Here we show that unfolding the cause-effect structure of directed grids can account for how time feels--namely, flowing. First, we argue that the conscious present is experienced as flowing because it is composed of phenomenal distinctions (moments) that are directed, and these distinctions are related in a way that satisfies directed inclusion, connection, and fusion. We then show that directed grids, which we conjecture constitute the substrate of temporal experience, yield a cause-effect structure that accounts for these and other properties of temporal experience. In this account, the experienced present does not correspond to a process unrolling in "clock time," but to a cause-effect structure specified by a system in its current state: time is a structure, not a process. We conclude by outlining similarities and differences between the experience of time and space, and some implications for the neuroscience, psychophysics, and philosophy of time. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_13198 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Why does time feel the way it does? Towards a principled account of temporal experience Comolatti, Renzo Grasso, Matteo Tononi, Giulio Neurons and Cognition Time flows, or at least the time of our experience does. Can we provide an objective account of why experience, confined to the short window of the conscious present, encompasses a succession of moments that slip away from now to then--an account of why time feels flowing? Integrated Information Theory (IIT) aims to account for both the presence and quality of consciousness in objective, physical terms. Given a substrate's architecture and current state, the formalism of IIT allows one to unfold the cause-effect power of the substrate, yielding a cause-effect structure. According to IIT, this accounts in full for the presence and quality of experience, without any additional ingredients. In previous work, we showed how unfolding the cause-effect structure of non-directed grids, like those found in many posterior cortical areas, can account for the way space feels--namely, extended. Here we show that unfolding the cause-effect structure of directed grids can account for how time feels--namely, flowing. First, we argue that the conscious present is experienced as flowing because it is composed of phenomenal distinctions (moments) that are directed, and these distinctions are related in a way that satisfies directed inclusion, connection, and fusion. We then show that directed grids, which we conjecture constitute the substrate of temporal experience, yield a cause-effect structure that accounts for these and other properties of temporal experience. In this account, the experienced present does not correspond to a process unrolling in "clock time," but to a cause-effect structure specified by a system in its current state: time is a structure, not a process. We conclude by outlining similarities and differences between the experience of time and space, and some implications for the neuroscience, psychophysics, and philosophy of time. |
| title | Why does time feel the way it does? Towards a principled account of temporal experience |
| topic | Neurons and Cognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.13198 |