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Linear Contracts for Supermodular Functions Based on Graphs

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Pashkovich, Kanstantsin, Skitsko, Jacob
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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