On Monotone Persuasion

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Kolotilin, Anton, Li, Hongyi, Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Kolotilin, Anton
Li, Hongyi
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
author_facet Kolotilin, Anton
Li, Hongyi
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
contents We study monotone persuasion in the linear case, where posterior distributions over states are summarized by their mean. We solve the two leading cases where optimal unrestricted signals can be nonmonotone. First, if the objective is s-shaped and the state is discrete, then optimal monotone signals are upper censorship, whereas optimal unrestricted signals may require randomization. Second, if the objective is m-shaped and the state is continuous, then optimal monotone signals are interval disclosure, whereas optimal unrestricted signals may require nonmonotone pooling. We illustrate our results with an application to media censorship.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_14400
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle On Monotone Persuasion
Kolotilin, Anton
Li, Hongyi
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Theoretical Economics
We study monotone persuasion in the linear case, where posterior distributions over states are summarized by their mean. We solve the two leading cases where optimal unrestricted signals can be nonmonotone. First, if the objective is s-shaped and the state is discrete, then optimal monotone signals are upper censorship, whereas optimal unrestricted signals may require randomization. Second, if the objective is m-shaped and the state is continuous, then optimal monotone signals are interval disclosure, whereas optimal unrestricted signals may require nonmonotone pooling. We illustrate our results with an application to media censorship.
title On Monotone Persuasion
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.14400