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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.14818 |
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| _version_ | 1866929640528936960 |
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| author | Flammini, Michele Greco, Gianluigi Varricchio, Giovanna |
| author_facet | Flammini, Michele Greco, Gianluigi Varricchio, Giovanna |
| contents | In this paper, we consider the problem of fair division of indivisible goods when the allocation of goods impacts society. Specifically, we introduce a second valuation function for each agent, determining the social impact of allocating a good to the agent. Such impact is considered desirable for the society -- the higher, the better. Our goal is to understand how to allocate goods fairly from the agents' perspective while maintaining society as happy as possible. To this end, we measure the impact on society using the utilitarian social welfare and provide both possibility and impossibility results. Our findings reveal that achieving good approximations, better than linear in the number of agents, is not possible while ensuring fairness to the agents. These impossibility results can be attributed to the fact that agents are completely unconscious of their social impact. Consequently, we explore scenarios where agents are socially aware, by introducing related fairness notions, and demonstrate that an appropriate definition of fairness aligns with the goal of maximizing the social objective. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_14818 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Fair Division with Social Impact Flammini, Michele Greco, Gianluigi Varricchio, Giovanna Computer Science and Game Theory In this paper, we consider the problem of fair division of indivisible goods when the allocation of goods impacts society. Specifically, we introduce a second valuation function for each agent, determining the social impact of allocating a good to the agent. Such impact is considered desirable for the society -- the higher, the better. Our goal is to understand how to allocate goods fairly from the agents' perspective while maintaining society as happy as possible. To this end, we measure the impact on society using the utilitarian social welfare and provide both possibility and impossibility results. Our findings reveal that achieving good approximations, better than linear in the number of agents, is not possible while ensuring fairness to the agents. These impossibility results can be attributed to the fact that agents are completely unconscious of their social impact. Consequently, we explore scenarios where agents are socially aware, by introducing related fairness notions, and demonstrate that an appropriate definition of fairness aligns with the goal of maximizing the social objective. |
| title | Fair Division with Social Impact |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.14818 |