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Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Bergemann, Dirk, Bojko, Marek, Dütting, Paul, Leme, Renato Paes, Xu, Haifeng, Zuo, Song
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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