Shaping the Safety Boundaries: Understanding and Defending Against Jailbreaks in Large Language Models
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866915295910690816 |
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| author | Gao, Lang Geng, Jiahui Zhang, Xiangliang Nakov, Preslav Chen, Xiuying |
| author_facet | Gao, Lang Geng, Jiahui Zhang, Xiangliang Nakov, Preslav Chen, Xiuying |
| contents | Jailbreaking in Large Language Models (LLMs) is a major security concern as it can deceive LLMs to generate harmful text. Yet, there is still insufficient understanding of how jailbreaking works, which makes it hard to develop effective defense strategies. We aim to shed more light into this issue: we conduct a detailed large-scale analysis of seven different jailbreak methods and find that these disagreements stem from insufficient observation samples. In particular, we introduce \textit{safety boundary}, and we find that jailbreaks shift harmful activations outside that safety boundary, where LLMs are less sensitive to harmful information. We also find that the low and the middle layers are critical in such shifts, while deeper layers have less impact. Leveraging on these insights, we propose a novel defense called \textbf{Activation Boundary Defense} (ABD), which adaptively constrains the activations within the safety boundary. We further use Bayesian optimization to selectively apply the defense method to the low and the middle layers. Our experiments on several benchmarks show that ABD achieves an average DSR of over 98\% against various forms of jailbreak attacks, with less than 2\% impact on the model's general capabilities. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_17034 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Shaping the Safety Boundaries: Understanding and Defending Against Jailbreaks in Large Language Models Gao, Lang Geng, Jiahui Zhang, Xiangliang Nakov, Preslav Chen, Xiuying Computation and Language Jailbreaking in Large Language Models (LLMs) is a major security concern as it can deceive LLMs to generate harmful text. Yet, there is still insufficient understanding of how jailbreaking works, which makes it hard to develop effective defense strategies. We aim to shed more light into this issue: we conduct a detailed large-scale analysis of seven different jailbreak methods and find that these disagreements stem from insufficient observation samples. In particular, we introduce \textit{safety boundary}, and we find that jailbreaks shift harmful activations outside that safety boundary, where LLMs are less sensitive to harmful information. We also find that the low and the middle layers are critical in such shifts, while deeper layers have less impact. Leveraging on these insights, we propose a novel defense called \textbf{Activation Boundary Defense} (ABD), which adaptively constrains the activations within the safety boundary. We further use Bayesian optimization to selectively apply the defense method to the low and the middle layers. Our experiments on several benchmarks show that ABD achieves an average DSR of over 98\% against various forms of jailbreak attacks, with less than 2\% impact on the model's general capabilities. |
| title | Shaping the Safety Boundaries: Understanding and Defending Against Jailbreaks in Large Language Models |
| topic | Computation and Language |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.17034 |