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From Competition to Centralization: The Oligopoly in Ethereum Block Building Auctions

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Wu, Fei, Thiery, Thomas, Leonardos, Stefanos, Ventre, Carmine
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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