On the Effectiveness of Adversarial Training on Malware Classifiers
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866914171571929088 |
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| author | Bostani, Hamid Cortellazzi, Jacopo Arp, Daniel Pierazzi, Fabio Moonsamy, Veelasha Cavallaro, Lorenzo |
| author_facet | Bostani, Hamid Cortellazzi, Jacopo Arp, Daniel Pierazzi, Fabio Moonsamy, Veelasha Cavallaro, Lorenzo |
| contents | Adversarial Training (AT) is a key defense against Machine Learning evasion attacks, but its effectiveness for real-world malware detection remains poorly understood. This uncertainty stems from a critical disconnect in prior research: studies often overlook the inherent nature of malware and are fragmented, examining diverse variables like realism or confidence of adversarial examples in isolation, or relying on weak evaluations that yield non-generalizable insights. To address this, we introduce Rubik, a framework for the systematic, multi-dimensional evaluation of AT in the malware domain. This framework defines diverse key factors across essential dimensions, including data, feature representations, classifiers, and robust optimization settings, for a comprehensive exploration of the interplay of influential AT's variables through reliable evaluation practices, such as realistic evasion attacks. We instantiate Rubik on Android malware, empirically analyzing how this interplay shapes robustness. Our findings challenge prior beliefs--showing, for instance, that realizable adversarial examples offer only conditional robustness benefits--and reveal new insights, such as the critical role of model architecture and feature-space structure in determining AT's success. From this analysis, we distill four key insights, expose four common evaluation misconceptions, and offer practical recommendations to guide the development of truly robust malware classifiers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_18218 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On the Effectiveness of Adversarial Training on Malware Classifiers Bostani, Hamid Cortellazzi, Jacopo Arp, Daniel Pierazzi, Fabio Moonsamy, Veelasha Cavallaro, Lorenzo Machine Learning Cryptography and Security Adversarial Training (AT) is a key defense against Machine Learning evasion attacks, but its effectiveness for real-world malware detection remains poorly understood. This uncertainty stems from a critical disconnect in prior research: studies often overlook the inherent nature of malware and are fragmented, examining diverse variables like realism or confidence of adversarial examples in isolation, or relying on weak evaluations that yield non-generalizable insights. To address this, we introduce Rubik, a framework for the systematic, multi-dimensional evaluation of AT in the malware domain. This framework defines diverse key factors across essential dimensions, including data, feature representations, classifiers, and robust optimization settings, for a comprehensive exploration of the interplay of influential AT's variables through reliable evaluation practices, such as realistic evasion attacks. We instantiate Rubik on Android malware, empirically analyzing how this interplay shapes robustness. Our findings challenge prior beliefs--showing, for instance, that realizable adversarial examples offer only conditional robustness benefits--and reveal new insights, such as the critical role of model architecture and feature-space structure in determining AT's success. From this analysis, we distill four key insights, expose four common evaluation misconceptions, and offer practical recommendations to guide the development of truly robust malware classifiers. |
| title | On the Effectiveness of Adversarial Training on Malware Classifiers |
| topic | Machine Learning Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.18218 |