Linear-quadratic Stochastic Stackelberg Differential Games with Affine Constraints

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Gou, Zhun, Huang, Nan-Jing, Long, Xian-Jun, Kang, Jian-Hao
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Gou, Zhun
Huang, Nan-Jing
Long, Xian-Jun
Kang, Jian-Hao
author_facet Gou, Zhun
Huang, Nan-Jing
Long, Xian-Jun
Kang, Jian-Hao
contents This paper investigates the non-zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential games with affine constraints, which depend on both the follower's response and the leader's strategy. With the help of the stochastic Riccati equations and the Lagrangian duality theory, the feedback expressions of optimal strategies of the follower and the leader are obtained and the dual problem of the leader's problem is established. Under the Slater condition, the equivalence is proved between the solutions to the dual problem and the leader's problem, and the KKT condition is also provided for solving the dual problem. Then, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is provided for the linear-quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential games with affine constraints, and a new positive definite condition is proposed for ensuring the uniqueness of solutions to the dual problem. Finally, two non-degenerate examples with indefinite coefficients are provided to illustrate and to support our main results.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_18802
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Linear-quadratic Stochastic Stackelberg Differential Games with Affine Constraints
Gou, Zhun
Huang, Nan-Jing
Long, Xian-Jun
Kang, Jian-Hao
Optimization and Control
This paper investigates the non-zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential games with affine constraints, which depend on both the follower's response and the leader's strategy. With the help of the stochastic Riccati equations and the Lagrangian duality theory, the feedback expressions of optimal strategies of the follower and the leader are obtained and the dual problem of the leader's problem is established. Under the Slater condition, the equivalence is proved between the solutions to the dual problem and the leader's problem, and the KKT condition is also provided for solving the dual problem. Then, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is provided for the linear-quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential games with affine constraints, and a new positive definite condition is proposed for ensuring the uniqueness of solutions to the dual problem. Finally, two non-degenerate examples with indefinite coefficients are provided to illustrate and to support our main results.
title Linear-quadratic Stochastic Stackelberg Differential Games with Affine Constraints
topic Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.18802