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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.20449 |
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| _version_ | 1866916545326743552 |
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| author | Toso, Tommaso Frasca, Paolo Kibangou, Alain Y. |
| author_facet | Toso, Tommaso Frasca, Paolo Kibangou, Alain Y. |
| contents | Traditional non-atomic selfish routing games present some limitations in properly modeling road traffic. This paper introduces a novel type of non-atomic selfish routing game leveraging concepts from Daganzo's cell transmission model (CTM). Each network link is characterized by a supply and demand mechanism that enforces capacity constraints based on current density, providing a more accurate representation of real-world traffic phenomena. We characterize the Wardrop equilibria and social optima of this game and identify a previously unrecognized inefficiency in selfish routing: partially transferring Wardrop equilibria, where only part of the exogenous flow traverses the network. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_20449 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Selfish routing on transportation networks with supply and demand constraints Toso, Tommaso Frasca, Paolo Kibangou, Alain Y. Optimization and Control Traditional non-atomic selfish routing games present some limitations in properly modeling road traffic. This paper introduces a novel type of non-atomic selfish routing game leveraging concepts from Daganzo's cell transmission model (CTM). Each network link is characterized by a supply and demand mechanism that enforces capacity constraints based on current density, providing a more accurate representation of real-world traffic phenomena. We characterize the Wardrop equilibria and social optima of this game and identify a previously unrecognized inefficiency in selfish routing: partially transferring Wardrop equilibria, where only part of the exogenous flow traverses the network. |
| title | Selfish routing on transportation networks with supply and demand constraints |
| topic | Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.20449 |