Re(l)ality: The View From Nowhere vs. The View From Everywhere

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Author: Bamonti, Nicola
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Bamonti, Nicola
author_facet Bamonti, Nicola
contents This paper investigates the mathematical and philosophical foundations of relational observables and reference frames using the fibre bundle formalism. Two paradigms are contrasted: the View from Nowhere, which interprets frame-dependent observables as perspectives on an invariant equivalence class, and the View from Everywhere which interprets each frame-dependent observables as a fully-fledged fundamental reality. The ontology endorsed by the View from Everywhere, termed Relality, is inherently fragmented, yet not solipsistic: inter-translatability between distinct, frame-dependent realities is possible. The paper challenges perspectivalist metaphysics and critiques the reliance on frame-free structures, arguing they obscure both empirical content and physical information. Central to the discussion is the challenge of providing a perspicuous and parsimonious characterisation of the gauge-invariant content of the theory.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_20520
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Re(l)ality: The View From Nowhere vs. The View From Everywhere
Bamonti, Nicola
History and Philosophy of Physics
General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology
This paper investigates the mathematical and philosophical foundations of relational observables and reference frames using the fibre bundle formalism. Two paradigms are contrasted: the View from Nowhere, which interprets frame-dependent observables as perspectives on an invariant equivalence class, and the View from Everywhere which interprets each frame-dependent observables as a fully-fledged fundamental reality. The ontology endorsed by the View from Everywhere, termed Relality, is inherently fragmented, yet not solipsistic: inter-translatability between distinct, frame-dependent realities is possible. The paper challenges perspectivalist metaphysics and critiques the reliance on frame-free structures, arguing they obscure both empirical content and physical information. Central to the discussion is the challenge of providing a perspicuous and parsimonious characterisation of the gauge-invariant content of the theory.
title Re(l)ality: The View From Nowhere vs. The View From Everywhere
topic History and Philosophy of Physics
General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.20520