Strategic Learning and Trading in Broker-Mediated Markets
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866908773643190272 |
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| author | Aqsha, Alif Drissi, Fayçal Sánchez-Betancourt, Leandro |
| author_facet | Aqsha, Alif Drissi, Fayçal Sánchez-Betancourt, Leandro |
| contents | We study strategic interactions in a broker-mediated market in which agents learn and exploit each other's private information. A broker provides liquidity to an informed trader and to noise traders while managing inventory in a lit market. The informed trader infers the broker's trading activity in the lit market, while the broker estimates the trader's private signal. Information leakage in the client's trading flow generates economic value for the broker that is comparable in magnitude to transaction costs: the broker can speculate profitably and manage risk more effectively, which in turn adversely affects the informed trader's performance. Brokers therefore hold a strategic advantage over traders who rely solely on prices to filter information. When the broker only relies on prices rather than client trading flow to infer information, their trading performance becomes indistinguishable from the performance of a naive strategy that internalises noise flow, externalises informed flow, and offloads inventory at a constant rate. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_20847 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Learning and Trading in Broker-Mediated Markets Aqsha, Alif Drissi, Fayçal Sánchez-Betancourt, Leandro Trading and Market Microstructure We study strategic interactions in a broker-mediated market in which agents learn and exploit each other's private information. A broker provides liquidity to an informed trader and to noise traders while managing inventory in a lit market. The informed trader infers the broker's trading activity in the lit market, while the broker estimates the trader's private signal. Information leakage in the client's trading flow generates economic value for the broker that is comparable in magnitude to transaction costs: the broker can speculate profitably and manage risk more effectively, which in turn adversely affects the informed trader's performance. Brokers therefore hold a strategic advantage over traders who rely solely on prices to filter information. When the broker only relies on prices rather than client trading flow to infer information, their trading performance becomes indistinguishable from the performance of a naive strategy that internalises noise flow, externalises informed flow, and offloads inventory at a constant rate. |
| title | Strategic Learning and Trading in Broker-Mediated Markets |
| topic | Trading and Market Microstructure |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.20847 |