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Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Ferreira, Matheus V. X., Gafni, Yotam, Resnick, Max
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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