Intrinsic meaning, perception, and matching

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Mayner, William G. P., Juel, Bjørn Erik, Tononi, Giulio
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Mayner, William G. P.
Juel, Bjørn Erik
Tononi, Giulio
author_facet Mayner, William G. P.
Juel, Bjørn Erik
Tononi, Giulio
contents Integrated information theory (IIT) argues that the substrate of consciousness is a maximally irreducible complex of units. Together, subsets of the complex specify a cause-effect structure, composed of distinctions and their relations, which accounts in full for the quality of experience. The feeling of a specific experience is also its meaning for the subject, which is thus defined intrinsically, regardless of whether the experience occurs in a dream or is triggered by processes in the environment. Here we extend IIT's framework to characterize the relationship between intrinsic meaning, extrinsic stimuli, and causal processes in the environment, illustrated using a simple model of a sensory hierarchy. We argue that perception should be considered as a structured interpretation, where a stimulus from the environment acts merely as a trigger for the complex's state and the structure is provided by the complex's intrinsic connectivity. We also propose that perceptual differentiation - the richness and diversity of structures triggered by representative sequences of stimuli - quantifies the meaningfulness of different environments to a complex. In adaptive systems, this reflects the "matching" between intrinsic meanings and causal processes in an environment.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2412_21111
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Intrinsic meaning, perception, and matching
Mayner, William G. P.
Juel, Bjørn Erik
Tononi, Giulio
Neurons and Cognition
Integrated information theory (IIT) argues that the substrate of consciousness is a maximally irreducible complex of units. Together, subsets of the complex specify a cause-effect structure, composed of distinctions and their relations, which accounts in full for the quality of experience. The feeling of a specific experience is also its meaning for the subject, which is thus defined intrinsically, regardless of whether the experience occurs in a dream or is triggered by processes in the environment. Here we extend IIT's framework to characterize the relationship between intrinsic meaning, extrinsic stimuli, and causal processes in the environment, illustrated using a simple model of a sensory hierarchy. We argue that perception should be considered as a structured interpretation, where a stimulus from the environment acts merely as a trigger for the complex's state and the structure is provided by the complex's intrinsic connectivity. We also propose that perceptual differentiation - the richness and diversity of structures triggered by representative sequences of stimuli - quantifies the meaningfulness of different environments to a complex. In adaptive systems, this reflects the "matching" between intrinsic meanings and causal processes in an environment.
title Intrinsic meaning, perception, and matching
topic Neurons and Cognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.21111