Market Making with Fads, Informed, and Uninformed Traders

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Barucci, Emilio, Mathieu, Adrien, Sánchez-Betancourt, Leandro
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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author Barucci, Emilio
Mathieu, Adrien
Sánchez-Betancourt, Leandro
author_facet Barucci, Emilio
Mathieu, Adrien
Sánchez-Betancourt, Leandro
contents We characterise the solutions to a continuous-time optimal liquidity provision problem in a market populated by informed and uninformed traders. In our model, the asset price exhibits fads -- these are short-term deviations from the fundamental value of the asset. Conditional on the value of the fad, we model how informed traders and uninformed traders arrive in the market. The market maker knows of the two groups of traders but only observes the anonymous order arrivals. We study both, the complete information and the partial information versions of the control problem faced by the market maker. In such frameworks, we characterise the value of information, and we find the price of liquidity as a function of the proportion of informed traders in the market. Lastly, for the partial information setup, we explore how to go beyond the Kalman-Bucy filter to extract information about the fad from the market arrivals.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_03658
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Market Making with Fads, Informed, and Uninformed Traders
Barucci, Emilio
Mathieu, Adrien
Sánchez-Betancourt, Leandro
Trading and Market Microstructure
Mathematical Finance
We characterise the solutions to a continuous-time optimal liquidity provision problem in a market populated by informed and uninformed traders. In our model, the asset price exhibits fads -- these are short-term deviations from the fundamental value of the asset. Conditional on the value of the fad, we model how informed traders and uninformed traders arrive in the market. The market maker knows of the two groups of traders but only observes the anonymous order arrivals. We study both, the complete information and the partial information versions of the control problem faced by the market maker. In such frameworks, we characterise the value of information, and we find the price of liquidity as a function of the proportion of informed traders in the market. Lastly, for the partial information setup, we explore how to go beyond the Kalman-Bucy filter to extract information about the fad from the market arrivals.
title Market Making with Fads, Informed, and Uninformed Traders
topic Trading and Market Microstructure
Mathematical Finance
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.03658