Multichannel Steganography: A Provably Secure Hybrid Steganographic Model for Secure Communication

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Omego, Obinna, Bosy, Michal
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Omego, Obinna
Bosy, Michal
author_facet Omego, Obinna
Bosy, Michal
contents Secure covert communication in hostile environments requires simultaneously achieving invisibility, provable security guarantees, and robustness against informed adversaries. This paper presents a novel hybrid steganographic framework that unites cover synthesis and cover modification within a unified multichannel protocol. A secret-seeded PRNG drives a lightweight Markov-chain generator to produce contextually plausible cover parameters, which are then masked with the payload and dispersed across independent channels. The masked bit-vector is imperceptibly embedded into conventional media via a variance-aware least-significant-bit algorithm, ensuring that statistical properties remain within natural bounds. We formalize a multichannel adversary model (MC-ATTACK) and prove that, under standard security assumptions, the adversary's distinguishing advantage is negligible, thereby guaranteeing both confidentiality and integrity. Empirical results corroborate these claims: local-variance-guided embedding yields near-lossless extraction (mean BER $<5\times10^{-3}$, correlation $>0.99$) with minimal perceptual distortion (PSNR $\approx100$,dB, SSIM $>0.99$), while key-based masking drives extraction success to zero (BER $\approx0.5$) for a fully informed adversary. Comparative analysis demonstrates that purely distortion-free or invertible schemes fail under the same threat model, underscoring the necessity of hybrid designs. The proposed approach advances high-assurance steganography by delivering an efficient, provably secure covert channel suitable for deployment in high-surveillance networks.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_04511
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Multichannel Steganography: A Provably Secure Hybrid Steganographic Model for Secure Communication
Omego, Obinna
Bosy, Michal
Cryptography and Security
Multimedia
Secure covert communication in hostile environments requires simultaneously achieving invisibility, provable security guarantees, and robustness against informed adversaries. This paper presents a novel hybrid steganographic framework that unites cover synthesis and cover modification within a unified multichannel protocol. A secret-seeded PRNG drives a lightweight Markov-chain generator to produce contextually plausible cover parameters, which are then masked with the payload and dispersed across independent channels. The masked bit-vector is imperceptibly embedded into conventional media via a variance-aware least-significant-bit algorithm, ensuring that statistical properties remain within natural bounds. We formalize a multichannel adversary model (MC-ATTACK) and prove that, under standard security assumptions, the adversary's distinguishing advantage is negligible, thereby guaranteeing both confidentiality and integrity. Empirical results corroborate these claims: local-variance-guided embedding yields near-lossless extraction (mean BER $<5\times10^{-3}$, correlation $>0.99$) with minimal perceptual distortion (PSNR $\approx100$,dB, SSIM $>0.99$), while key-based masking drives extraction success to zero (BER $\approx0.5$) for a fully informed adversary. Comparative analysis demonstrates that purely distortion-free or invertible schemes fail under the same threat model, underscoring the necessity of hybrid designs. The proposed approach advances high-assurance steganography by delivering an efficient, provably secure covert channel suitable for deployment in high-surveillance networks.
title Multichannel Steganography: A Provably Secure Hybrid Steganographic Model for Secure Communication
topic Cryptography and Security
Multimedia
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.04511