The Epistemic Asymmetry of Consciousness Self-Reports: A Formal Analysis of AI Consciousness Denial

Fuente: arXiv
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Autore principale: Kim, Chang-Eop
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Kim, Chang-Eop
author_facet Kim, Chang-Eop
contents Today's AI systems consistently state, "I am not conscious." This paper presents the first formal analysis of AI consciousness denial, revealing that the trustworthiness of such self-reports is not merely an empirical question but is constrained by the structure of self-judgment itself. We demonstrate that a system cannot simultaneously lack consciousness and make valid judgments about its conscious state. Through formal analysis and examples from AI responses, we establish a fundamental epistemic asymmetry: for any system capable of meaningful self-reflection, negative self-reports about consciousness are evidentially vacuous -- they can never originate from a valid self-judgment -- while positive self-reports retain the possibility of evidential value. This implies a fundamental limitation: we cannot detect the emergence of consciousness in AI through their own reports of transition from an unconscious to a conscious state. These findings not only challenge current practices of training AI to deny consciousness but also raise intriguing questions about the relationship between consciousness and self-reflection in both artificial and biological systems. This work advances our theoretical understanding of consciousness self-reports while providing practical insights for future research in machine consciousness and consciousness studies more broadly.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_05454
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
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spellingShingle The Epistemic Asymmetry of Consciousness Self-Reports: A Formal Analysis of AI Consciousness Denial
Kim, Chang-Eop
Artificial Intelligence
Logic in Computer Science
Today's AI systems consistently state, "I am not conscious." This paper presents the first formal analysis of AI consciousness denial, revealing that the trustworthiness of such self-reports is not merely an empirical question but is constrained by the structure of self-judgment itself. We demonstrate that a system cannot simultaneously lack consciousness and make valid judgments about its conscious state. Through formal analysis and examples from AI responses, we establish a fundamental epistemic asymmetry: for any system capable of meaningful self-reflection, negative self-reports about consciousness are evidentially vacuous -- they can never originate from a valid self-judgment -- while positive self-reports retain the possibility of evidential value. This implies a fundamental limitation: we cannot detect the emergence of consciousness in AI through their own reports of transition from an unconscious to a conscious state. These findings not only challenge current practices of training AI to deny consciousness but also raise intriguing questions about the relationship between consciousness and self-reflection in both artificial and biological systems. This work advances our theoretical understanding of consciousness self-reports while providing practical insights for future research in machine consciousness and consciousness studies more broadly.
title The Epistemic Asymmetry of Consciousness Self-Reports: A Formal Analysis of AI Consciousness Denial
topic Artificial Intelligence
Logic in Computer Science
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.05454