Blackwell Equilibrium in Repeated Games
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866910778696663040 |
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| author | Cavounidis, Costas Ghosh, Sambuddha Hörner, Johannes Solan, Eilon Takahashi, Satoru |
| author_facet | Cavounidis, Costas Ghosh, Sambuddha Hörner, Johannes Solan, Eilon Takahashi, Satoru |
| contents | We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite of this requirement depends on the monitoring structure. Under perfect monitoring, a ``folk'' theorem holds relative to an appropriate notion of minmax. Under imperfect public monitoring, absent a public randomization device, any perfect public equilibrium generically involves pure action profiles or stage-game Nash equilibria only. Under private conditionally independent monitoring, in a class of games that includes the prisoner's dilemma, the stage-game Nash equilibrium is played in every round. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_05481 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Blackwell Equilibrium in Repeated Games Cavounidis, Costas Ghosh, Sambuddha Hörner, Johannes Solan, Eilon Takahashi, Satoru Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite of this requirement depends on the monitoring structure. Under perfect monitoring, a ``folk'' theorem holds relative to an appropriate notion of minmax. Under imperfect public monitoring, absent a public randomization device, any perfect public equilibrium generically involves pure action profiles or stage-game Nash equilibria only. Under private conditionally independent monitoring, in a class of games that includes the prisoner's dilemma, the stage-game Nash equilibrium is played in every round. |
| title | Blackwell Equilibrium in Repeated Games |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.05481 |