Sundholm's explanation of meaning: logical atavism and the nature of proofs
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866916653203193856 |
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| author | d'Aragona, Antonio Piccolomini |
| author_facet | d'Aragona, Antonio Piccolomini |
| contents | I provide an overview of some of Sundholm's remarks on the history and philosophy of logic. In particular, I focus on Sundholm's proposal to explain meaning with no object-language/metalanguage distinction, and to provide a consequently contentual approach to formalisms for proofs. When applied to Gentzen's Natural Deduction in its two 1935 and 1936 variants, this triggers a reading of each variant as pointing to one of the poles in the distinction between proof-objects and proof-acts, also introduced by Sundholm. I suggest that the basis of this picture is given by a Martin-Loefian reading of the notion of analytic assertion. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2501_07588 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Sundholm's explanation of meaning: logical atavism and the nature of proofs d'Aragona, Antonio Piccolomini Logic I provide an overview of some of Sundholm's remarks on the history and philosophy of logic. In particular, I focus on Sundholm's proposal to explain meaning with no object-language/metalanguage distinction, and to provide a consequently contentual approach to formalisms for proofs. When applied to Gentzen's Natural Deduction in its two 1935 and 1936 variants, this triggers a reading of each variant as pointing to one of the poles in the distinction between proof-objects and proof-acts, also introduced by Sundholm. I suggest that the basis of this picture is given by a Martin-Loefian reading of the notion of analytic assertion. |
| title | Sundholm's explanation of meaning: logical atavism and the nature of proofs |
| topic | Logic |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.07588 |