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Autore principale: d'Aragona, Antonio Piccolomini
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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Accesso online:https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.07588
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author d'Aragona, Antonio Piccolomini
author_facet d'Aragona, Antonio Piccolomini
contents I provide an overview of some of Sundholm's remarks on the history and philosophy of logic. In particular, I focus on Sundholm's proposal to explain meaning with no object-language/metalanguage distinction, and to provide a consequently contentual approach to formalisms for proofs. When applied to Gentzen's Natural Deduction in its two 1935 and 1936 variants, this triggers a reading of each variant as pointing to one of the poles in the distinction between proof-objects and proof-acts, also introduced by Sundholm. I suggest that the basis of this picture is given by a Martin-Loefian reading of the notion of analytic assertion.
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publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Sundholm's explanation of meaning: logical atavism and the nature of proofs
d'Aragona, Antonio Piccolomini
Logic
I provide an overview of some of Sundholm's remarks on the history and philosophy of logic. In particular, I focus on Sundholm's proposal to explain meaning with no object-language/metalanguage distinction, and to provide a consequently contentual approach to formalisms for proofs. When applied to Gentzen's Natural Deduction in its two 1935 and 1936 variants, this triggers a reading of each variant as pointing to one of the poles in the distinction between proof-objects and proof-acts, also introduced by Sundholm. I suggest that the basis of this picture is given by a Martin-Loefian reading of the notion of analytic assertion.
title Sundholm's explanation of meaning: logical atavism and the nature of proofs
topic Logic
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.07588